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Abstract—We propose a method to identify the source and
target regions of a copy-move forgery so allow a correct local-
isation of the tampered area. First, we cast the problem into
a hypothesis testing framework whose goal is to decide which
region between the two nearly-duplicate regions detected by a
generic copy-move detector is the original one. Then we design a
multi-branch CNN architecture that solves the hypothesis testing
problem by learning a set of features capable to reveal the
presence of interpolation artefacts and boundary inconsistencies
in the copy-moved area. The proposed architecture, trained on a
synthetic dataset explicitly built for this purpose, achieves good
results on copy-move forgeries from both synthetic and realistic
datasets. Based on our tests, the proposed disambiguation method
can reliably reveal the target region even in realistic cases where
an approximate version of the copy-move localization mask is
provided by a state-of-the-art copy-move detection algorithm.
Index Terms—Copy-move detection and localization, image
forensics, tampering detection and localization, deep learning for
forensics, Siamese networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the wide availability of easy-to-use image editing
tools, altering the visual content of digital images is becoming
simpler and simpler. Copy-Move (CM) forgery, where an
image region is copied into another part of the same image,
is one of the most common and easy-to-implement image
tampering. To detect this kind of forgery, several CM detection
and localization algorithms have been proposed, attempting to
determine whether a given image contains cloned regions, or
so called nearly duplicate regions (in which case, the image
is labeled as a suspect or forged image). The great majority
of the algorithms proposed so far rely on local hand-crafted
features [1], [2], and are grouped into two main categories:
block-based (also called patch-based) methods, e.g. [3], [4],
and keypoints-based methods, [5], [6], [7]. Both approaches
have their strengths and weaknesses and a solution capable
to outperform all the others in every working conditions is
not available yet. Motivated by the recent trend towards the
adoption of Deep Learning (DL) methods for image forensic
tasks, DL-based approaches have also been proposed for CM
detection. Such methods are capable to automatically learn
and extract descriptors from the image, e.g. in [8], [9], by
means of Deep Neural Network (DNNs), that hence work as
feature extractors. End-to-end DNN-based solutions for copy-
move tampering localization have also been proposed, as in
[10], [11], where a convolutional and de-convolutional module
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work together to directly produce a copy move forgery mask
from the to-be-analyzed input image.
The great majority of the algorithms proposed so far can
only detect the copy-move forgery and localize the nearly
duplicate areas, providing a binary mask that highlights both
the source region and its displaced version, without identifying
which of the two regions corresponds to the source area
and which to the target one. However, in hindsight, only
the target region of a copy-move forgery corresponds to a
manipulated area; therefore, distinguishing between source and
target regions is of primary importance to correctly localize
the tampered area and possibly trace back to the goal of the
forgery. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper ad-
dressing the problem of source-target disambiguation in copy-
move forgeries is [11]. In that work, an end-to-end system
for CM localization and disambiguation, called BusterNet, is
proposed, based on a DNN architecture with two-branches.
The first branch is designed to extract a pool of features
revealing general traces of manipulations. These features are
then combined with those extracted from the other branch,
in charge of copy-move detection. With regard to the CM
forgery detection (CMFD) performance, the method in [11]
provides good results in many cases. Wirth regard to source-
target disambiguation, however, the performance achieved on
realistic publicly available CM datasets are rather limited. As
stated by the authors themselves, this may be due to the limited
performance of the manipulation detection branch, which tends
to overfit to the synthetic dataset used for training.
In this paper, we propose a new DNN-based method to
address the problem of source-target disambiguation in images
subject to CM manipulation. Given the binary localization
mask produced by a generic copy-move detector, our method
permits to derive the actual tampering mask, by identifying
the target and source region of the copy-move. The main idea
behind the proposed method is to exploit the non-invertibility
of the copy-move transformation, due to the presence of
interpolation artefacts and local post-processing traces in the
displaced region. Specifically, we propose a multi-branch CNN
architecture, called DisTool, consisting of two main parallel
branches, looking for two different kinds of CM-traces. The
first branch, named 4-Twins Net, consists of two parallel
Siamese networks, trained in such a way to exploit the non-
invertibility of the copy-move process caused by the interpola-
tion artefacts often associated to the copy-move operation. The
second branch is a Siamese network [12] designed to identify
artefacts and inconsistencies present at the boundary of the
copy-moved region. The soft outputs of the two branches are,
finally, fused through a simple fusion module. A remarkable
strength of the proposed method is that it works independently
of the CM detection algorithm, and hence it can be used on top
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2of any such method. Our experiments show that the proposed
method has a very good disambiguation capabilities, greatly
outperforming those of [11], and that it generalizes well to
both synthetic and realistic copy-move forgeries from several
different datasets. Robustness to post-processing is also good.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formal-
ize the CM source-target disambiguation problem addressed
in the paper, and present the rationale behind the proposed
method. Section III describes the approach followed for esti-
mating the CM geometric transformation between the source
and target regions. The details of the multi-branch CNNs
composing the system are given in Section IV. In Section
V, we describe the methodology we followed to run the
experiments whereby we validated the effectiveness of the
proposed method. The results of the experiments are reported
and discussed in Section VI. The paper ends in Section VII,
with some concluding remarks.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND OVERALL DESCRIPTION
OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we provide a rigorous formulation of the
source-target disambiguation problem and present the overall
architecture of the proposed system. Before doing that, we
introduce some basic concepts and notation, and detail the
main steps involved in the creation of a copy-move forgery.
Among the various instances of copy-move forgeries that
can be encountered in practice, in this work, we focus on the
common, and simplest, case of a single source region copy-
moved into a single target location (referred to as (1-1) CM).
The case of n sources singularly copied into n target locations,
namely the (n-n) case, can be interpreted as multiple instances
of the (1-1) case and can be treated as such. More complicated
copy-move forgeries, i.e., multi-target copy moves (i.e., (n-
m), with m > n), must be treated differently, for instance,
by performing a preliminary analysis in order to trace back
this case to the solution of several (1-1) problems, and are left
for future investigation. When the target region is partially
overlapped to the source, only the non-overlapping parts of
the copied and pasted regions are regarded to as a copy-move
forgery.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 1: A CM forged image (a); corresponding binary local-
ization mask (b); tampering map with highlighted the source
(green) and target (red) regions (c); final (desired) tampering
map (d).
A. Preliminaries
Let I be the original image of size l×m, and If the copy-
move forgery, of the same size1. We denote with S and T
1For simplicity, we consider the case of gray-scale images. Similar argu-
ments apply to the case of color images.
the subparts of If corresponding to the source and the target
region, respectively.
During a copy-move forgery, the region S is copied, possi-
bly altered geometrically, and pasted into T . In its most basic
form, the copy-move operation can be modeled as a geometric
affine transformation between S and T . Let Hθ denote the
transformation that maps a generic point (u, v) in the source
region S into another point (u′, v′) in T , parameterized by
a vector θ. Such a transformation can be represented in
homogeneous coordinates by a matrix Hθ as follows:u′v′
1
 = Hθ
uv
1
 =
θ1,1 θ1,2 θ1,3θ2,1 θ2,2 θ2,3
0 0 1
uv
1
 . (1)
The transformation matrix Hθ can represent a rotation, re-
sizing or scaling, sheering, translation, or, more in general,
a composition of them (translation is also considered thanks
to the use of homogeneous coordinates). Then, ideally, for
every (u′, v′), we would have If (u′, v′) = I(u, v), where
the relation between (u, v) and (u′, v′) is established by the
matrix Hθ. In general, after the transformation, the mapped
point is not a valid point in the 2D regular pixel grid, that
is, u′ and v′ in (1) are not integers. The pixel values at
the regular grid points are therefore obtained by interpolating
the neighboring pixels of the source region by means of a
kernel function k(·, ·). For simplicity, we let Ψθ,k denote the
transformation that maps the pixels in the source regions S
to those in the target region T , taking into account both the
geometric transformation Hθ and the interpolation process
with kernel k. Then, T = Ψθ,k(S)2. The interpolation process
introduces correlations among neighboring pixels in T . After
interpolation, S and T are nearly duplicate regions (the regions
are not identical because of the interpolation). In most cases,
the interpolation process makes the copy-move operation non-
invertible.
In realistic copy-move forgeries, various post-processing
operations might also be applied locally to the target region
in order to hide the traces of copy-pasting. For example, the
pasted region and the background are often blended to visually
hide the transition from the copied part and the surrounding
area. Post-processing might also be applied globally, in which
case it affects both the source and the target regions.
An example of CM forged image is provided in Fig.
1(a) along with the corresponding localization mask (b). The
disambiguation map is provided in Fig. 1(c), where the same
color labelling convention of [11] is followed, with the green
channel corresponding to the source mask, the red channel to
the target mask and the blue channel to the background mask.
The final binary tampering mask for the image, where only
the target region is highlighted (corresponding to the tampered
part), is reported in Fig. 1(d).
B. Problem formulation and rationale of the proposed solution
As we said, our goal is to devise a method for source-
target disambiguation that exploits the non-invertibility of the
2Strictly speaking, some pixels on the boundary of T are obtained by
interpolating also pixels that do not belong to S, i.e. pixels in S¯
3copy-move process caused by interpolation. To improve the
effectiveness of the algorithm, we also exploit the possible
presence of boundary artifacts in the target region (e.g. those
due to blending), which are not present in the source. In fact,
even if copy-move tampering is carried out properly, subtle
boundary artifacts and edge inconsistencies are often present
and can be exploited for the disambiguation task.
The general scheme of the architecture we designed to
solve the CM disambiguation problem is provided in Fig. 2.
The input to the system are the forged image If , and the
localization mask consisting of two separate regions. Note that
we refer to the case of spatially separated regions for sake
simplicity, however, the analysis is still valid for contiguous
regions, assuming that the CM detection algorithm outputs two
distinct regions.
Transformation 
estimation
Mask
Interpolation
artifacts
analysis
Boundary
artifacts
analysis
Fusion
Fig. 2: Scheme of the proposed CM disambiguation system.
Let us first focus on the upper branch of Fig. 2. Given a
pair of nearly duplicate regions, our first approach to disam-
biguate the source and target regions relies on the following
observation: if one tries to replicate the copy-move process
starting from the source region, i.e. in the forward direction,
ideally, it is possible to re-obtain exactly the target region (in
practice, the exact parameters of the transformation bringing
S into T are not known exactly, so we will only obtain a
very good approximation of T ). On the other hand, if one
tries to mimic a copy-move process starting from the target
region, i.e. in the backward direction, an exact copy (or even a
good approximation) of the source region can not be obtained,
due to the non-invertibility of the copy-move process. In other
words, when the target region T is moved onto the source S,
the approximated source region differs significantly from S
due to the double interpolation process that the transformed
region is subject to (from source to target, and then from
target to source again), while no interpolation artifacts are
present in the source region, thus making the approximation
less close than in the opposite case, where both the target and
the approximation of the target are subject to a similar (ideally
the same) interpolation procedure.
Based on this idea, starting from the two regions and their
approximated versions, the problem of disambiguating the
source and target regions can be formulated as the following
composite hypothesis test. Let P1 and P2 denote the two
nearly duplicate regions resulting from the binary localization
map provided by the copy-move detector. Then, the composite
hypothesis test we have to solve must decide between the
following cases3:
• H0: P2 ≈ Ψθ0,k0(P1), i.e., P1 ≡ S (and P2 ≡ T ).
3We use ≈ instead of ≡, since the equivalence may not be satisfied due to
the presence of post-processing.
• H1: P1 ≈ Ψθ1,k1(P2), i.e., P2 ≡ S (and P1 ≡ T )
where θ0 and θ1 are the parameters of the transformation
bringing P1 into P2 and viceversa, and k0 and k1 are the
interpolation kernel parameters. When hypothesis H0 holds,
then Ψθ0,k0 corresponds to the transformation applied during
the copy-move process, for some unknown parameter vector
θ0 of the geometric transformation Hθ0 , and kernel k0 of the
interpolation.
To test the two hypotheses, we need to consider the
transformation that moves P1 to P2, and viceversa (i.e., the
transformation that moves P2 to P1), and try to guess which
of the two is the forward direction. Therefore, as depicted
in Fig. 2, we should first estimate the parameters of the
transformation under both hypotheses and then choose the
direction for which the approximation obtained by means of
the estimated transformation is the best one. Formally, this is
equivalent to solve the following generalized likelihood ratio
test (GLRT):
maxθ0,k0 Pr{P1 ≈ Ψθ0,k0(P2)|P1, P2, If}
maxθ1,k1 Pr{P2 ≈ Ψθ1,k1(P1)|P1, P2, If}
H0
≷
H1
1. (2)
For simplicity, the effects at the borders of the target region,
due to possible local post-processing, are not taken into
account in the above formulation.
Since the interpolation method adopted for the copy move is
unknown, strictly speaking, it should be estimated. However,
in our practical implementation, we have assumed that a
bilinear interpolation is used, hence k0 = k1 = k, where k
is the bilinear kernel4. Then, we only estimate the parameters
of the geometric transformations, that is, θ0 and θ1.
When the interpolation artifacts are weak or not present at
all, e.g., when the copy-move consists of a rigid translation
of an integer number of pixels, we have P1 ≈ Ψθ0,k(P2) and
P2 ≈ Ψθ1,k(P1), with Hθ1 = H−1θ0 (the kernel k is close to a
delta function), and then we cannot make a reliable decision
based on the test in (2). The bottom branch of the scheme in
Fig. 2 is introduced to cope with these cases. Such a branch
exploits the possible presence of artifacts along the boundaries
of P1 and P2. For the target region, in fact, boundary artifacts
are likely to be present given that the inner and outer parts of T
come from different parts of I . These artifacts are not expected
to be present across the boundary of S. Therefore, the presence
of such artifacts or other inconsistencies along the boundary
of one region between P1 and P2 can be exploited to decide
which of the two regions correspond to S and which to T . A
further motivation for the inclusion of a branch dedicated to
the presence of artifacts along region boundaries, is that the
interpolation traces could be partially erased when a strong
post-processing is applied globally, thus making it difficult
to solve the disambiguation problem via the composite test
formalized above. In these cases, the analysis of boundary
inconsistencies can be useful.
Eventually, the result of the analysis of interpolation and
boundary artifacts is fused (last block in Fig. 2).
4Based on the experiments, the approach works with real-word copy-move
datasets with possibly different interpolation methods; then, such a simplifying
assumption is not too limiting.
4u1
u2
P1
P2
(a)
u
′
1
u2
P
′
1
P2
w1
h1
w2
h2
(b)
Fig. 3: Illustrations of rotation angle and scaling factor esti-
mation.
III. GEOMETRIC TRANSFORMATION ESTIMATION
Copy-move detection methods provide a binary localization
mask highlighting the regions interested by the copy move,
yet only some of them provide an estimate of the geometric
transformation mapping one region into the other. Therefore,
in the first step of the disambiguation chain, we estimate the
geometric transformation bringing P1 into P2. It goes without
saying that the estimation can be skipped if the copy-move
detector already provides such an estimate (see for instance
the keypoint-based detector in [13], where an estimation of the
transformation is provided via the RANSAC algorithm [14]).
Hereafter, we describe the method adopted in our system to
estimate the parameters of the affine geometric transformation
moving one region into the other. With a slight abuse of
notation, in this section, the regions P1 and P2 are regarded
as the sets with the coordinates of the pixels in the x − y
image plane, and not as the values of the pixels belonging to
the regions.
Given the binary localization mask, our goal is to estimate
the homography matrix (having the form in (1)), that maps
the pixels in P1 into those of P2, to obtain a remapped region
P˜2 that is as similar as possible to P2 (and viceversa for the
backward transformation). In its more general form, Hθ is
an affine geometric transformation. In this paper, for sim-
plicity, we consider only similarity transformations, namely
translations, resizing or scaling and rotations and, more in
general, a composition of them. In this case, the transformation
in equation (1) can always be expressed as the subsequent
application of a rotation with angle α, a scaling with factors
fx, fy , and two translations tx, ty , that is5
Hθ =
1 0 tx0 1 ty
0 0 1
fx 0 00 fy 0
0 0 1
cos(α) − sin(α) 0sin(α) cos(α) 0
0 0 1
 .
(3)
With the above ideas in mind, the estimation of the geo-
metric transformation between the candidate source and target
regions is carried out according to the following three steps: i)
estimation of the rotation angle α, ii) estimation of the resizing
factors fx, fy , and iii) estimation of the translations tx and ty .
5While, in general, any composition of translations, rotations and scalings
can be perfectly represented by a single rotation followed by a single scaling
and a single translation, the interpolation artefacts associated to real geometric
transformations may introduce some dependency on the order and the exact
way the different transformations are applied. In this paper we neglect such
phenomenum.
To estimate α, we find the two central principal inertia
axes of P1 and P2 and let α be equal to the difference
between them. Note that such axes are well defined for most
regions since pasted objects are never perfectly circular. In
particular, we adopt a Principle Component Analysis (PCA)
[15], to determine the direction along with the second-order
central moments of projected points is maximized. The direc-
tions found in this way, represented by the column vectors
u1 = [u1,1, u1,2]
T , and u2 = [u2,1, u2,2]T , are illustrated in
Fig. 3(a).
To be more specific, let us denote with P the 2×N matrix
whose i-th column pi represents the vector of 2-D coordinates
of point i within P1, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , where N denotes the number
of points in P1, and with p¯ = 1N
∑N
i=1 pi the centroid of P1.
If we assume uT1 u1 = 1, the second-order central moment of
the projected points in P1 is given by:
1
N
N∑
i=1
(uT1 pi − uT1 p¯)2 = uT1 S1u1,
where S1 = 1N
∑N
i=1 (pi − p¯) (pi − p¯)T is the inertia matrix
of the the points in P1. The principle component u1 is found
by:
u1 = arg max
u:uTu=1
uTS1u .
It can be demonstrated that u1 is the eigenvector correspond-
ing to the largest eigenvalue of S1. We find u2 in a similar
way. Then the angle α is computed as:
α = tan−1
{
u2,2
u2,1
}
− tan−1
{
u1,2
u1,1
}
.
Once the rotation angle has been estimated, P1 is rotated
by the angle α, to obtain a new region P
′
1. To estimate the
scaling parameters fx and fy , we first determine the h1 ×w1
bounding box of P
′
1 and the h2 ×w2 bounding box of P2, as
illustrated in Fig. 3 (b), the scaling factors are then computed
as: fx = w2w1 , fy =
h2
h1
. Finally, the translation terms are merely
the difference between the centroids of P
′
1 and P2.
By applying the same procedure to estimate the transfor-
mation mapping P2 into P1, we would simply obtain H−1θ .
Therefore, for simplicity, the transformation is estimated in
one direction only (as detailed above), and H−1
θˆ
is used as
the transformation bringing P2 onto P16.
In the following, we let P˜2 = Ψθˆ,k(P1), where θˆ is the
estimated vector of the parameters of the transformation that
moves P1 into P2 (w.l.o.g.), and then P˜1 = Ψθˆ′,k(P2) where
Hθ′ = Hθ
−1.
IV. MULTI-BRANCH CNN ARCHITECTURE
The core of the disambiguation system is represented by the
blocks that analyze the interpolation artifacts and the boundary
inconsistencies (see Fig. 2). For their implementation, we
designed two multiple-branch classifiers based on CNNs: a
network with 4 parallel branches, called 4-Twins Net, and
6This is possible since the estimated transformation applies to the points
in the binary mask, and not directly to the pixel values (that is, interpolation
of grey levels is not considered to estimate Hθˆ).
5a Siamese network [12], named Siamese Net. The 4-Twins
network is in charge of analysing the interpolation artifacts,
while the Siamese network is used to reveal boundary inconsis-
tencies. The outputs of the two networks are finally merged by
a score-level fusion module. A block diagram of the resulting
architecture, hereafter referred to as DisTool, is shown in Fig.
4. A preliminary step is carried out before running the two
networks to identify the input region, or Focus of Attention
(FoA), of the networks. Each FoA module takes as input
the forged image If , the binary localization mask (i.e., the
output mask of the CM detection algorithm) with the two
separate regions P1 and P2, and the geometric transformations
estimated as explained in Section III.
4-Twins 
Net
Siamese 
Net
Fusion
Mask (     ,     )    
DisTool
FoA
FoA
Fig. 4: Block diagram of the proposed disambiguation method
based on multiple-branch CNNs (DisTool), implementing the
scheme in Fig. 2.
We observe that, while Siamese-like architectures have
recently been used for addressing several multimedia forensic
tasks, see for instance [16], [17], [18], we explicitly designed
the 4-Twins architecture for our specific purpose, in order
to facilitate the learning of the interpolation artifacts. The
motivation behind the use of this multi-branch architecture
will be more clear in the sequel.
A. 4-Twins Net
The 4-Twins network takes as input the two pairs of regions
(P1, P˜1) and (P2, P˜2) (the specific FoA for 4-Twins Net is
described in Section IV-A1)
Let x = [x1, x2, x3, x4] = [(P1, P˜1), (P2, P˜2)] and y = 0, 1
be a vector with the pixels of the regions P1, P˜1, P2, and P˜2,
and let y ∈ {0, 1} indicate the identity of the source and target
regions, namely y = 0 if x = [(S, S˜), (T, T˜ )] (holding under
hypothesis H0), and y = 1 if x = [(T, T˜ ), (S, S˜)] (holding
under hypothesis H1). An illustrative example of the patches
at the input of 4-Twins Net is provided in Fig. 5 (upper row).
The decision is in favor of the hypothesis that maximizes
the output score (softmax) function ftw. Therefore, if
ftw(x|y = 0) > ftw(x|y = 1), (4)
then P1 is identified as the source region (H0 holds), and
viceversa if the opposite inequality holds.
The architecture of 4-Twins Net and the details of the
training procedure are described in the following. Before, we
give the details of the FoA module.
1
(Target)
(Transformation 
of the source)
(Source) (Transformation 
of the target)
Source
Target
(Target 
boundary)
(Transformation 
of the boundary
of the source)
Source
Target
Fig. 5: Illustrative example of the patches at the input of 4-
Twins Net (upper row) and Siamese Net (lower row).
1) Focus of Attention (FoA): The two pairs of regions
(P1, P˜1) and (P2, P˜2) can not be directly fed to 4-Twins Net.
The practical problem is that the source and target regions
of a copy-move can be large and, moreover, their sizes vary
from image to image. In order to feed all the branches with
patches of the same size, that we set to 64 × 64 × 3, the
4-dim input vector x of 4-Twins Net is built as follows
(the first steps are common to Siamese Net). Given the
two regions P1 and P2, we fit a rectangular bounding box
to each region. Let us denote the bounding box of P1 as
P b1 . The bounding box will then contain the entire region P1
(foreground) and some neighboring pixels belonging to P¯1
(background). In the same way, we build the rectangular patch
P b2 . Then, we compute P˜
b
2 = Ψθˆ,k(P
b
1 ) and P˜
b
1 = Ψθˆ′,k(P
b
2 ),
using bilinear interpolation. In this way, we get the quadruple
[(P b1 , P˜
b
1 ), (P
b
2 , P˜
b
2 )]. To get the 4 inputs of 4-Twins Net, we
crop the 64× 64 central part of each region in the quadruple.
Notice that, in this way, we are implicitly assuming that the
bounding boxes of the source and target regions of the copy-
move regions are always larger than 64× 64 (hence, 64× 64
is considered as minimum region size).
To avoid complicating the notation, in the following we will
not distinguish between regions and patches and continue to
refer to P1, P2, and P˜1, P˜2 to denote the inputs of 4-Twins
Net. An example of the patches forming the input vector x of
4-Twins Net is given in Fig. 7 for the example in Fig. 6.
2) Network Architecture: The architecture of the 4-Twins
Net is given in Fig. 8. It consists of four identical stacks of
convolutional layers (i.e. all of them share the same weights),
and two identical stacks of fully connected layers. The role of
the stacked convolutional layers in each branch is to extract
a 512-dim feature vector from each input patch, of size 64×
64 × 3. We denote the stacked convolutional layers as F(·).
The 512-dim feature vectors from the first and second pairs of
branches are concatenated by means of a combination function
C(·, ·) in a 1024-dim vector, and then given as input to the
fully connected layers. The fully connected layers return a
score (called logit) which is later normalized into a probability
value by means of softmax non-linear activation functions. In
6Fig. 6: Forged image from CASIA [21] (left) and its ground
truth tampering map (right).
Fig. 7: Input vector for 4-Twins Net for the image in Fig. 6
(center crop).
summary, the 4-Twins architecture consists of two Siamese
networks in parallel, sharing the weights of the convolutional
layers and the fully connected layers.
For each Siamese network, we used exactly the same
pipeline which has been successfully used as a matching model
in computer vision [19], [20]. Each Siamese network has
a single output neuron. Let z0, z1 denote the score outputs
(logits) of the two Siamese network branches with inputs
(x1, x2) and (x3, x4), respectively. The dependency between
z0 and z1 is enforced by the following softmax operation:
ftw(x|y = i) = e
zi∑
j∈{0,1}
ezj
, i = 0, 1. (5)
Given M training examples {(x(j), y(j))j∈[1,M ]}, the 4-Twins
Net is trained to minimize the empirical cross entropy loss
function between input labels and predictions, that is:
L = − 1
M
M∑
j=1
∑
i∈{0,1}
(
y
(j)
i log f
(j)
tw (x|y = i)
)
,
where [y(j)0 , y
(j)
1 ] is the one-hot encoding of y
(j) (the one-hot
encoding of label 0 is the binary vector [0, 1], that of label 1 is
[1, 0]). From (5), we observe that, in order to get a small loss,
z0 and z1 must be respectively large and small when y = 0
(i.e., under H0), and small and large, when y = 1 (i.e., under
H1).
In the following, we report the details of the feature extrac-
tion, combination and fully connected part of each Siamese
branch.
Feature extractor F . We considered the 50-layers Residual
Network (ResNet) in [22]. Such a deep architecture is well
suited to learn complex pixel relationships 7. We refer to [22]
for a detailed description of this network. The only change
we made compared to [22] is the output size, which is set to
512 instead of 1000. Then, in our architecture, we considered
4 identical branches of 50-layers ResNet (F), with shared
weights, for the convolutional part.
7Based on preliminary results that we carried out, shallow architectures do
not permit to achieve high accuracy for our task.
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Fig. 8: The proposed 4-Twins Net architecture. The one-hot
encoding of the predicted label is reported in output.
Feature combiner C. Before feeding the fully-connected
layers, we need to fuse the feature vectors produced by the
two Siamese branches F . Some popular choices for doing
so are: the point-wise absolute difference [20], the square
Euclidean distance [16], and the concatenation [18]. We chose
to implement the combination by means of a concatenation as
done in [18].
Fully connected part. We considered 2 fully connected
layers with input and output sizes respectively equal to 1024
and 256, and, 256 and 1. The final soft output of the two fully
connected branches are combined by means of a softmax
layer, as detailed in the previous section.
3) Training strategy: In this section, we describe the strate-
gies that we followed to feed the data to 4-Twins Net during
training. During our experiments we found that such strategies
are critical to the success of the 4-Twins Net.
The network is trained with both positive (H0) and negative
(H1) examples, in equal percentage; then, the trained model
minimizes the overall error probability over the training set.
To force the network to learn the interpolation artifacts, the
source and target regions of the forged images used for training
are purposely built so that they are always much larger than
64×64 (see Section V-A for the details of the dataset creation
process). In this way, the 64 × 64 input patches obtained by
cropping the central part of the regions contain only fore-
ground pixels. Training 4-Twins Net is performed knowing
the ground truth localization mask and the exact geometric
transformations between S and T , that is, the forward and
backward transformation Hθ. Then, the approximated regions
P˜ b1 and P˜
b
2 are derived by considering the true transformation
matrix Hθ. A small random perturbation is applied in order to
mimic a practical scenario in which the transformation esti-
mation is not perfect. Specifically, the true angle is perturbed
by a random quantity in [−5◦, 5◦] (with step 1◦), and the true
7resizing factor is randomly distorted by a value in [−0.1, 0.1]
(with quantization step 0.01).
Due to feature concatenation, the network is sensitive to the
order of the inputs in each pair, that is in (x1, x2) and (x3, x4).
Let us assume that the first input corresponds to the original
(source or target) patch and the second input to the transformed
patch. In principle, switching between x1 and x2, as well as
between x3 and x4, should leave the predictions unchanged.
To enforce this property, we randomly shuffle (x1, x2) and
(x3, x4) during training so that 4-Twins Net does not learn
the order of the inputs. Under y = 0, this corresponds to
consider not only the pair x = [(S, S˜), (T, T˜ )], but also the
pairs x = [(S˜, S), (T, T˜ )], x = [(S˜, S), (T˜ , T )], and x =
[(S, S˜), (T˜ , T )]. A similar strategy is applied under y = 1.
Moreover, since the 4 branches of the convolutional layers are
forced to be identical, each of them is fed with samples from
all the categories during training, that is {S, S˜, T , T˜}, so to
avoid any bias.
Batch Normalization (BN) [23] is performed after each
layer in the feature extraction part F , by normalizing the
layer outputs so that hey have zero-mean and unit-variance.
Normalization is done by accumulating means and standard
deviations on mini-batches. Given that in 4-Twins Net, the
data flows through four branches, this procedure needs care:
in particular, in order to avoid biasing the accumulated means
and standard deviations, we ensure that, within each mini-
batch, each of the four branches is fed with all four categories
{S, S˜, T , T˜}. Then, the statistics are accumulated on one
branch only and broadcasted to the other branches in order to
make the four Fs identical.
B. Siamese Net
As we said, the goal of the Siamese Net is to detect
boundary inconsistencies. The choice of this structure was
based on the following observation. When P1 is the source
(H0), we expect that the pixels across the boundary of P1
and the complementary region P¯1 do not present significant
inconsistencies, while, when P1 is the target (H1), the presence
of inconsistencies along the boundary between P1 and P¯1 is
more likely. Let B1 (res. B2) denote an image region that
includes P1 (res. P2) and some outer pixels of P1 (res. P2) ,
i.e., part of the complementary region P¯1 (res. P¯2). Similarly,
BS (res. BT ) denotes an image region that includes S (res. T )
and some outer pixels of S (res. T ). Regions B1 and B2 have
the same (or very similar) content inside the inner region and
a different content in the outer part. So we would like that
the network learns to focus on the relationship between the
inner and outer region. i.e. to focus on the values of the pixels
across the boundary of the copied part.
The transformation that maps one region into the other, e.g.
P1 into P2, also maps (at least approximately because of the
interpolation) the boundary of P1 into that of P2. Therefore,
the Siamese network is fed with input pairs (B1, B˜1) (or,
similarly, (B2, B˜2)) where B˜1 is obtained by remapping B2
according to the geometric transformation that maps P2 into
P1, that is, B˜1 = Ψθˆ,k(B2). The details about the exact way
whereby the regions B1 and B2 are built, pertaining to the
FoA block preceding Siamese Net, are described in Section
IV-B1. Let x′ = [x′1, x
′
2] = [B1, B˜1] and y ∈ {0, 1}. The
relative position of the patches in the pair determines the value
of y: if x′ = [BS , B˜S ], that is P1 ≡ S (hypothesis H0), then
y = 0; if instead x′ = [BT , B˜T ], that is P2 ≡ S (hypothesis
H1), then y = 1.
An illustrative example of input pairs feeding the Siamese
Net is shown in Fig. 5 (lower row).
The decision is in favor of the hypothesis that maximizes
the output soft function fsi(·). Therefore, the condition
fsi([B1, B˜1]|y = 0) > fsi([B1, B˜1]|y = 1), (6)
indicates that P1 is the source (H0 holds), while the opposite
inequality indicates that P2 is the source (H1 holds).
We notice that the use of an architecture with 4 branches,
like the 4-Twins Net, is not necessary in this case. In fact,
regardless of the direction of the transformation, one region
between B1 and B˜1, will exhibit inconsistencies between the
pixels inside and those outside the boundary, while the other
will not. In a similar way, one between B2 and B˜2 will contain
inconsistencies across the boundary, while the other will not.
The FoA, the architecture of Siamese Net and the details
of the training procedure are described in the following.
1) Focus of Attention (FoA): To get the input pair x′ for
Siamese Net, we start with one of the pairs of bounding
box regions (P b1 , P˜
b
1 ) and (P
b
2 , P˜
b
2 ), obtained as described in
Section IV-A1. In order to increase the chance of capturing a
good extent of boundary regions, each bounding box region is
cropped at the 4 corners, i.e., top left, top right, bottom left,
bottom right to get the 64×64 input patches. All the resulting
4 input pairs are tested and the most confident prediction score
is selected for the final decision.
To avoid complicating the notation, we continue to use B1,
B2 and B˜1, B˜2, to denote the inputs of Siamese Net.
The possible test input vectors for Siamese Net, for the
example in Fig. 6, are provided in Fig. 9.
2) Network architecture: The architecture of Siamese Net
corresponds to the one forming the branches of 4-Twins Net.
Let z be the output (logit) of the Siamese neural network, the
soft (probabilistic) score fsi is computed through a sigmoid
activation:
fsi (x|y = 1) = 1
1 + e−z
. (7)
Given M training examples {(x(j), y(j))
j∈[1,M ]}, the
Siamese Net is trained to minimize the empirical cross
entropy loss Lsi between the predictions f (j)si and the input
labels y(j).
3) Training strategy: To force the network to look at bound-
ary inconsistencies, we trained Siamese Net by considering
only copy moves obtained by rigid translations, so that: i)
no interpolation artifacts are present (the copy moved part is
identical to the source region), ii) the boundaries of the two
regions match perfectly. The input pair used during training
then corresponds to x′ = [BS , BT ] and x′ = [BT , BS ].
In order to avoid undesired biases, the network is fed with
inputs of the form x′ = [BS , BT ] and x′ = [BT , BS ] in a
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Fig. 9: Examples of the input pairs for Siamese Net, for the
image in Fig. 6. y = 0 for the examples of input pairs in the
left (since B1 = S), while for those on the right y = 1 (since
B2 = T ).
similar percentage. Note that in this case, switching x′1 and
x′2 is accompanied by label switching: in fact, according to
the way we trained the network, the output of Siamese Net
depends on the relative position of the patch containing the
source boundary and the target boundary. Therefore, if x′ =
[BS , BT ], then y = 0, whereas if x = [BT , BS ], then y = 1.
C. Fusion module
The output scores ftw(·) and fsi(·) provided by 4-Twins
Net and Siamese Net are fused by means of a simple fusion
module, as illustrated in Fig. 4. Score-level fusion is performed
by assigning a reliability to the output of 4-Twins Net and
Siamese Net, based on the knowledge we have about the
performance of the two networks under various settings. More
specifically, the two scores ftw(·) and fsi(·) are weighted
based on the (real or estimated) transformation mapping P1
into P2. Let us denote with wtr(Hθ) the weight assigned to
the 4-Twins Net score when the estimated transformation is
Hθ (wtr ∈ [0, 1]), and with wsi(Hθ) the weight assigned to
the output of Siamese Net, where wtr(Hθ) + wsi(Hθ) = 1.
We anticipate that, based on our tests, 4-Twins Net achieves
very good performance when the transformation can be es-
timated with sufficient accuracy and relatively strong inter-
polation artifacts are present in the image, while it is less
reliable in the other cases, that is, basically, when the copy-
move is close to a rigid translation. When the transformation is
a rigid translation, in fact, the two input pairs of 4-Twins Net
are identical. On the other hand, Siamese Net works very
well (with almost perfect performance) when a close to rigid
translation is applied, while is generally less reliable in the
other cases. For this reason, in our experiments we considered
the following weights:
wtr(Hθ) =
 c if (|α| > 15 ∨ |fx − 1| > 0.1∨ |fy − 1| > 0.1)
1− c otherwise
, (8)
where c is a constant larger than 0.5 (we remind that α denotes
the rotation angle and fx and ft the scaling factors). As to wsi,
we obviously have wsi = 1− wtr.
An alternative solution could be to choose one of the two
networks before actually applying them, e.g. based on the
estimated transformation (network selection scenario). How-
ever, fusing the outputs of both networks permits to get an
advantage when a choice between one of the two architectures
cannot be properly made. As we will see in the experimental
section, this is the case, for instance, when heavy local post-
processing is applied to the boundary of the target region (in
which case the Siamese Net looses accuracy, while 4-Twins
Net is more robust and still works well), or in the presence
of global post processing, e.g. JPEG compression (in which
case the performance of 4-Twins Net is heavily impaired). In
these cases, fusing the outputs of both networks allows to get
better performance.
V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY AND SETTINGS
In this section, we first describe the procedure that we
followed to generate the synthetic datasets used for training
and validating 4-Twins Net and Siamese Net. Then, we
present the datasets (both synthetic and real) used for testing.
Finally, we describe the scenarios considered in our tests.
A. Synthetic Dataset Creation
To train the multi-branch CNN, and in particular the 4-
Twins Net, a large amount of labeled data is needed, i.e.
many (x, y) samples. Therefore, a large amount of copy-move
forgeries with ground-truth mask and labeled source and target
regions is required. In [11], a dataset with 105 copy-move
forged images has been built and made publicly available. This
dataset, however, is too small for our goal. To avoid the risk
of overfitting, we synthesized ourselves a large-scale synthetic
dataset of copy-move forged images by considering several
geometrical transformations and post-processing, starting from
pristine images of different datasets8. Specifically, a dataset
with 9×105 forged images, hereafter denoted as SYN-Tr was
generated for training (and validation). We also built a smaller
set of 3× 103 forged images for testing (namely SYN-Ts), as
detailed in Section V-B.
The creation of SYN-Tr (and SYN-Ts) involves three steps.
Background preparation. We first selected a pool of pris-
tine images from several datasets. Specifically, approximately
28, 000 images (both in raw and JPEG formats) were taken
from the RAISE_2k [24], DRESDEN [25] and VISION [26]
datasets to build SYN-Tr, in similar proportions. For SYN-
Ts, we took 500 images from a personal camera Canon 600D
8The code used for the creation of the dataset is made pub-
licly available at https://github.com/andreacos/MultiBranch_CNNCopyMove_
Disambiguation, for reproducibility. A python implementation of DisTool, and
the trained models used for the tests, are also provided at the same link.
9(250 raw and 250 JPEG images, compressed using default
camera settings. For each image, we generated multiple forged
instances (as detailed below) by randomly cropping portions
of size 1024× 1024. The images having minimum dimension
smaller than 1024 were skipped.
Source selection. Each 1024 × 1024 image is split into
four subregions or quadrants. The source region is obtained by
considering one of these quadrants and generating a convex
polygon (from a subset of 20 random vertices, selected in
such a way that they form a convex hull) within a bounding
box of sizes 170× 170, randomly located within the selected
quadrant. The pixels inside the convex polygon belong to the
source region and then constitute the region S.
Target creation. The target region is obtained from the
source by means of a similarity transformation. In particular,
we considered rotation, resizing, and a composition of them
(i.e., rotation followed by resizing, and resizing followed by
rotation). Rotation angles were randomly picked in the range
[2◦, 180◦], with a sampling step of 2◦, while horizontal and
vertical resizing factors were randomly picked in [0.5, 2.0],
with sampling step 0.01. The geometrically reshaped region
is copy-pasted in the center of one of the three remaining
quadrants, thus obtaining the target region T . With regard
to the interpolation method, we used a bilinear interpolation.
To improve the quality of the forged images making them
more realistic, we blurred the boundary of the target region
by applying the following steps: i) detection of the edge of
the region from the target mask by using a high-pass filter
5 × 5, performing binary dilation for several iterations to
emphasize the edges (the number of iteration is empirically
set to 5), obtaining an edge enhanced mask ; ii) application of
an average filter to the image, with a size randomly selected in
{3×3, 5×5, 7×7, 9×9, 11×11}, in the positions identified by
the edge enhanced mask. Eventually, to mimic a real scenario,
we applied global post-processing with probability 0.5. The
post-processing types and the corresponding parameters are
detailed in Table I, along with their selection probability.
Another dataset, named SYN-Tr-Rigid, was generated to
train the Siamese Net, by starting from the same pool of im-
ages, but considering only rigid translations. Source selection
has been done within smaller bounding boxes of size 74× 74
such that the boundary can be easily captured during the patch
extraction process. Global post-processing is finally applied
(with probability 0.5) similarly as before. With regard to the
test set SYN-Ts, for each kind of transformation (H), 1000
forged images were generated, 500 with post-processing (PP) -
as described in Table I - and 500 without postprocessing. In the
following, we denote with SYN-Ts-H and SYN-Ts-H-PP the
datasets of test forged images generated using transformation
H, respectively without and with post-processing (PP). H can
be a rigid translation (Rigid), rotation and translation (Rot),
resizing and translation (Res).
B. Evaluation Datasets
We assessed the performance of our system on the datasets
reported below, all providing ground truth mask and source-
target labels for the copy-move forgeries.
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Fig. 10: Examples of forged images from the 4 datasets used in
our experiments. Red: target, green: source, blue: background.
• SYN-Ts. As detailed in Section V-A, this dataset contains
3× 103 test forged images.
• USCISI [11]. A synthetic dataset, consisting of 105
images, that were used for training and testing BusterNet
(in 9 to 1 proportion). All the images are taken from
SUN2012 dataset [27] and Microsoft COCO [28] that
provide the object segmentation mask. Objects are copy-
moved by means of geometrical transformations (see [11]
for more details). For our tests, we used all the 104 test
images.
• CASIA [21]. CASIA9 is the largest publicly available
benchmarking dataset for image forgery detection. A
subset of 1313 copy-move forged images was manually
selected, out of all the 5123 tampered ones, by the
authors of [11], to build this dataset of copy-moves, made
available online. Source and target regions were labeled
by comparing the tampered and the pristine images.
• Grip [29]. This dataset consists of 80 images tampered
with rigid copy-moves. Two post-processing, i.e. local
noise addition and global JPEG compression, were ap-
plied to these images, with different parameters, using
the software in [30], thus producing several categories of
copy-move forgeries. We manually annotated the source
and target regions of all the forged images by looking at
the information on the top-left coordinates of the source
and target regions provided by the software. Even if rather
small, this dataset is useful to test the performance in the
case of rigid copy-move.
Some examples of copy-move forgeries from the four datasets
are depicted in Fig. 10.
C. Parameters setting for networks training and fusion
The two networks 4-Twins Net and Siamese Net were
trained independently by using 810, 000 images from the
SYN-Tr dataset; the remaining 90, 000 images were reserved
9http://forensics.idealtest.org/casiav2.
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TABLE I: Post-processing and corresponding probabilities.
Processing type Processing parameters Prob.
Identity – 0.5
Lowpass filter
Gaussian, [3,3], std dev 0.5 0.017
Gaussian, [3,3], std dev 1 0.017
Gaussian, [3,3], std dev 1.5 0.017
Gaussian, [3,3], std dev 2 0.017
Averaging, [3,3] 0.017
Highpass filter unsharp, Laplacian, parameter 0.2 0.017
Denoising filter Wiener, size [3,3] 0.05Wiener, size [5,5] 0.05
Noise adding Gaussian, 0 mean, variance 0.001 0.1
Tonal adjustment
histogram stretching (saturation 2%, shape
parameter) 0.033
histogram stretching (saturation 6%, shape
parameter 0.8) 0.033
Histogram
equalization – 0.033
JPEG compres-
sion Quality Factors (QFs) in {55:5:100} 0.1
for validation. We trained both networks for approximately 60
epochs (375, 000 iterations with batch size 128) using Adam
optimizer. The learning rate was set to 10−4, and halved every
10 epochs from epoch 40 to improve convergence. We used
the Tensorflow framework for network training and testing.
For score-level fusion, the weighs wT and wS = 1 − wT
were set as in equation (8). We considered several values
of the constant c and selected the one achieving the best
fusion accuracies over the synthetic testing dataset SYN-Ts,
corresponding to c = 0.65.
D. Testing Scenarios
The testing scenarios considered for our experiments cor-
respond to: i) the ideal case of known binary mask with
undistinguished S and T , and known transformation, ii) the
case of known binary mask only, and iii) the realistic case
where everything is unknown and the mask corresponds to
the output of a state-of-the-art CM detection and localization
algorithm. The first two scenarios were considered to test the
disambiguation capability of the proposed approach, and the
impact of possible inaccuracies introduced by the estimation of
the geometric transformation. Then, in the third scenario, we
assessed the performance of an end-to-end system for copy-
move detection and localization that uses DisTool to identify
the source and target regions of the copy-move.
1) Known mask and transformation: In order to assess
the disambiguation capability of DisTool, we consider the
case in which both the binary localization mask (ground-truth
localization mask) and the transformation Hθ are given. For
these tests, we used the SYN-Ts and USCISI datasets, which
provide the ground truth for the transformation matrix. From
the forged images, the input patches of the 4-Twins Net and
Siamese Net branches are determined as detailed in Section
IV-A1 and IV-B1. The two separate regions of the ground-
truth mask P1 and P2, to be given as input to DisTool, are
isolated from the tampering map.
2) Known mask only: In this second testing scenario, we
considered the case where only the binary localization mask
is known. We then used the method described in Section III
to estimate the transformation from the binary masks of the
two regions. We tested the performance of DisTool on all the
four datasets, namely SYN-Ts, USCISI, CASIA, and Grip.
Furthermore, we assessed the robustness of the system to
post-processing on SYN-Ts-H-PP and Grip datasets, for which
processed versions of the forged images are provided.
3) End-to-end performance: In this scenario, we evaluated
the performance of an end-to-end system for simultaneously
copy-move localization and source-target disambiguation by
means of DisTool. For copy-move localization, we considered
the patch-based algorithm in [4], hereafter referred to as DF-
CMFD (Dense Field Copy-Move Forgery Detection), which
works reasonably well under general conditions (e.g., also
when the copy-moved area has a small size, or in presence of
local post-processing). In this case, a pre-processing step has
to be applied to determine the two regions, P1 and P2, from the
binary output mask provided by the localization algorithm. If
more than two regions are identified, then the (1-1) condition
is not met and the image is discarded. Specifically, we first
process the mask by applying a morphological opening, with a
square structuring element of size 2×2. After that, we perform
Connected Component (CC) analysis to label connected re-
gions, sort them by size, and discard the images for which the
ratio between the size of the third-ranked and second-ranked
regions is not small enough (the threshold is empirically set to
0.2). The number of images retained after this stage is denoted
as OptIn 10. The performance of the system are evaluated
on the OptIn set only. For the opted out images, in fact,
the two separated regions defining the CM operation cannot
be identified, and the disambiguation system cannot be run.
Reasonably, this should be regarded to as a failure of the CM
localization algorithm (more rarely, as a failure of the non
ideal pre-processing step).
For this testing scenario, the results are compared with those
achieved by BusterNet [11], which simultaneously aims at
copy-move localization and source-target disambiguation. For
a fair comparison, the disambiguation performance achieved
by BusterNet are assessed by considering the subset of images
for which two separate regions can be identified by the CM
localization branch of the algorithm (OptInB). Unlike our
approach, BusterNet may return the same label for the two
regions, that is, the regions are simultaneously labeled as
source and target. In this case, the algorithm fails and the ac-
curacy of the disambiguation is equivalent to a random choice
(error probability equal to 0.5). Notice that a comparison with
BusterNet is not possible for the first two testing scenarios,
since the method in [11] is an end-to-end one providing at
the same time the result of localization and disambiguation,
without the possibility of taking a localization mask as input
for the disambiguation part only.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As we said, we run our tests for the case of single source
and target copy-moves. In the datasets considered for our
10Note that, the above pre-processing is heuristic, however it is not of great
interest in this paper since it does not have a strong impact on the applicability
of the system.
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Fig. 11: Accuracy of DisTool (both 4-Twins Net, Siamese
Net, and fusion) for Grip under JPEG compression (left) and
noise addition (right). 80 images are considered for each case.
experiments, the number of images satisfying such condition
are: 9984 out of 10000 for USCISI-CMFD, 1276 out of 1313
for CASIA-CMFD and the entire Grip-CMFD.
As evaluation metric, we considered the accuracy of the
disambiguation task, computed as the ratio of correctly dis-
ambiguated copy-moves over the total number of opted-in
images. In the first and second testing scenario, the OptIn
set corresponds to the set of all the images with single source
and target.
A. Known Mask and Transformation
Table II reports the accuracy of 4-Twins Net, Siamese Net,
and after the final fusion step, on SYN-Ts and USCISI.
These results confirm that 4-Twins Net works very well
in all the cases, but when the transformation is a rigid
translation (SYN-Ts-Rigid) because the four patches are very
similar. Siamese Net instead works well in the presence
of rigid translation, as expected, while it exhibits slightly
lower performance in the presence of rotation and resizing.
The performance of Siamese Net on USCISI are very poor,
probably because most of the transformations in USCISI in-
clude very strong rotation and resizing, and the boundaries are
blended using a particular editing operation (Poison editing)
[31], which has not been considered in our training sets.
Nevertheless, thanks to the final fusion step, the overall
system achieves very good performance in all the cases and the
loss of performance with respect to 4-Twins Net and Siamese
Net in their best performing scenarios is very limited. In
particular, the results achieved by DisTool on USCISI show
that the proposed architecture works well also under database
mismatch conditions thus proving the good generalization
capability of our system.
TABLE II: Accuracy (%) of 4-Twins Net, Siamese Net and
DisTool on SYN-Ts and USCISI. The ground-truth is available
for both the mask and the transformation matrix.
Dataset OptIn 4-Twins Net Siamese Net DisTool
SYN-Ts-Rigid 1000 47.06 97.00 97.00
SYN-Ts-Rot 1000 99.40 93.10 99.50
SYN-Ts-Res 1000 99.30 95.60 99.90
USCISI 9984 94.48 30.51 91.40
B. Known Mask only
The accuracies of our system in this scenario are reported
in Table III. By looking at the performance on SYN-Ts and
USCISI, we can draw conclusions similar to those we drew
for the known transformation case (Table II), thus indicating
that our method for estimating the transformation works well.
When the more realistic datasets CASIA and Grip, are con-
sidered, the performance decrease a bit. This is not surprising,
given that the copy-move forgeries contained in these datasets
are produced manually in different ways, and under various
processing operations. For instance, forged images in CASIA
are produced by Photoshop, and advanced tools for tonal
adjustments have been used. The forgeries contained in Grip
consist of visually realistic snippets designed carefully by
photographic experts. Therefore, the results achieved in these
cases are also satisfactory. The poor performance of 4-Twins
Net on Grip are due to the fact that the copy-move forgeries
are all rigid translations (as in SYN-Ts-Rigid). Again, the
fusion step allows to improve the results of 4-Twins Net in
the most critical cases of close-to-rigid translations, without
impairing too much the performance in the other cases.
We also performed a robustness analysis. The performance
of our system in the presence of post-processing as described
in Table I and assessed on the SYN-Ts-H-PP dataset are
reported in Table IV. The robustness performance of our
system on Grip dataset, under JPEG compression with dif-
ferent quality factors (QFs) and addition of local noise of
various strength, are shown in Fig. 11. We observe that JPEG
compression, being a global post-processing, has a minor
impact on the performance of the system, unless the quality
of the image is significantly impaired (QF < 60). Addition
of local noise, instead, adds visual traces in the target and
thus source and target can be more easily disambiguated when
noise increases.
TABLE III: Accuracy (%) of 4-Twins Net, Siamese Net and
DisTool on all the four datasets. Only the binary mask is given.
Dataset OptIn 4-Twins Net Siamese Net DisTool
SYN-Ts-Rigid 1000 46.00 97.00 97.00
SYN-Ts-Rot 1000 98.30 91.10 97.90
SYN-Ts-Res 1000 99.30 95.70 97.60
USCISI 9984 94.39 45.73 91.56
CASIA 1276 69.04 67.16 75.86
Grip 80 53.75 86.26 86.26
TABLE IV: Accuracy (%) of 4-Twins Net, Siamese Net and
DisTool on SYN-Ts-H-PP. Only the binary mask is given.
Dataset OptIn 4-Twins Net Siamese Net DisTool
SYN-Ts-Rigid-PP 1000 50.40 94.80 94.80
SYN-Ts-Rot-PP 1000 96.30 89.60 95.90
SYN-Ts-Res-PP 1000 96.00 94.70 95.40
C. End-to-end performance
In this section, we report the performance of DisTool when
the network is used within an end-to-end copy-move detection
system with detection, localization and source-target disam-
biguation capabilities. With regard to the CM detection and
localization algorithm, we considered the DF-CMFD method
in [4] in all the cases, with the exception of the USCISI
dataset, where the method in [4] works poorly, and we used
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the CNN-based method proposed in [11] (BusterNet-CMFD).
The results of our tests are reported in Table V. In this case,
the OptIn images are the images for which the two duplicated
regions can be correctly identified after the application the CM
localization algorithm and the pre-processing. This number is
lower than the total number, much lower in some cases, mainly
due to the failures of the CM detection algorithm
The performance are compared to those achieved by Buster-
Net, on the OptInB set (last two columns). Even if the number
of OptIn and OptInB images is not the same, mainly due
to the difference in the localization method adopted in the
two cases, OptIn and OptInB have a similar meaning (see
Section V-D3), then, the disambiguation performance achieved
by our system on the OptIn set can be fairly compared to
those achieved by BusterNet on the set of OptInB images.
Noticeably, the number of duplicated regions correctly lo-
calized by DF-CMFD (OptIn) is always higher than the corre-
sponding number by BusterNet (OptInB), the only exception
being CASIA, where OptInB is 688, while OptIn is 482.
However, the performance of BusterNet in this case are very
poor, and the average accuracy of the disambiguation is about
50% (hence similar to a random guess). We also observed
that several times the same label (source or target) is assigned
to the two duplicated regions by BusterNet, meaning that the
method is not able to disambiguate between them.
By inspecting the table, we see that BusterNet method gives
better results compared to our method only on USCISI, which
is the same dataset used for training, hence corresponding
to a favorable case for that method. With the exception of
the USCISI dataset, DisTool always outperforms BusterNet,
achieving a better accuracy on all the datasets. Noticeably,
DisTool works pretty well in the most difficult cases with
public realistic datasets (CASIA and Grip).
We further emphasize that, in our experimental analysis,
we only considered two common and well-known methods
for CM detection and localization, namely those in [4] and in
[11]. Other methods could be considered as well (for instance
[32]). The fact that our systems can work on top of any CM
localization algorithm is in fact a remarkable strength of the
approach. Moreover, since different methods (e.g. patch-match
based or keypoints-based) have often different peculiarities and
work better in different conditions, the best CM localization
method could be chosen based on the kind of images under
analysis.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have proposed a method for source-target disambigua-
tion in copy-move forgeries. This problem has not gained
much attention in the past, yet solving the disambiguation
problem is of primary importance to correctly localize the
tampered region in a copy-move forgery. Common existing
algorithms, in fact, identify both the original (source) and
copied (target) region, yet only the target region corresponds
to a tampered area. To address this problem, we leveraged
on the capability of deep neural network architectures to
learn suitable features for exposing the target region, by
looking at the presence of interpolation artifacts and bound-
ary inconsistencies. Specifically, we proposed an architecture
with two multi-branch CNNs that extract different features
and perform the disambiguation independently; then, decision
fusion is applied at the score level. Our tests show that our
disambiguation method, called DisTool, performs well even
in the realistic testing scenario, where the copy-move binary
localization mask is provided by a CM detection algorithm and
the CM transformation is estimated from such mask. Based
on our tests, the proposed architecture trained on a synthetic
dataset achieves good results also on copy-move images from
realistic public datasets, then the generalization capability of
the method is also good.
As a future work, we could investigate other strategies to
perform fusion of the network outputs. In particular, methods
based on machine learning could be adopted, e.g. an SVM
or a random forest classifier. Another interesting possibility
would be to resort to fuzzy logic fusion [33]. A fuzzy fusion
module could also be integrated in the multi-branch CNNs
architecture, that could then be trained as a whole. In this
way, the weights of the fuzzy logic module could also be
optimized through backpropagation [34]. Finally, the analysis
of the multi-target copy moves scenario, i.e., the case (n-m),
with m > n, could also be considered as future research. In
this case, a pre-processing could be carried out to trace back
the problem to the solution of several (1-1) problems, that can
then be solved using the DisTool architecture presented in this
paper.
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